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THE ACCURACY OF HOUSING FORECASTING IN AUSTRALIA 
 
ABSTRACT 
Forecasting is an integral part of all business planning, and forecasting the outlook for 
housing is of interest to many firms in the housing construction sector. This research 
measures the performance of a number of industry forecasting bodies; this is done to 
provide users with an indicator to of the value of housing forecasting undertaken in 
Australia. 
 
The accuracy of housing commencement forecasts of three Australian organisations – 
the Housing Industry Association (HIA), the Indicative Planning Council for the 
Housing Industry (IPC) and BIS-Shrapnel - is examined through the empirical 
analysis of their published forecasts supplemented by qualitative data in the form of 
opinions elicited from several industry ‘experts’ employed in these organisations.  
 
Forecasting performance was determined by comparing the housing commencement 
forecast with the actual data collected by the Australian Bureau of Statistics on an ex-
post basis. Although the forecasts cover different time periods, the level of accuracy is 
similar, at around 11-13% for four-quarter-ahead forecasts. In addition, national 
forecasts are more accurate than forecasts for individual states. This is the first 
research that has investigated the accuracy of both private and public sector 
forecasting of housing construction in Australia. This allows users of the information 
to better understand the performance of various forecasting organisations. 
Keywords: Housing, housing commencements, forecasting, accuracy, Australia. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Forecasting is an integral part of all business planning, and forecasting the outlook for 
housing is of interest to many firms in the housing construction sector. However, in 
spite of the importance of forecasting housing activity, little research has been 
undertaken to determine the accuracy of forecasts produced by high profile 
forecasting organisations in Australia. This research attempts to redress that situation 
by measuring the performance of a number of industry forecasting bodies. This is 
done to provide an indicator to users of the value of housing forecasting in Australia. 
 
The housing industry needs to strategically plan for the effects of future changes in 
the economy and a number of public and private sector organisations publish activity 
forecasts for this purpose. Many studies have examined the accuracy of forecasts of 
major economic indicators such as inflation and economic growth (McNees and Ries 
1983; Adams 1986). These have shown that some economic indicators are more 
consistent than are others, and so easier to predict. In addition, some economic 
indicators change at different rates under different conditions, and at different times.  
It is important; therefore, to know the level of confidence that can be placed in the 
forecast, this is because if unreliable forecasts are used they may turn out to be 
misleading.  To do this, the performance of economic forecasters needs to be 
consistently monitored and put into the context of the economic circumstances of the 
time. 
 
Very few studies have considered the forecasting of housing commencements.  One 
study by Weber and Devaney (1996) in the USA, investigated the forecasting 
accuracy of housing starts (commencements), in order to determine whether consumer 
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sentiment could be used to improve forecasts of the number of housing starts.  Three 
forecasting models were examined using combinations of time-series models with 
indices of housing and consumer confidence.  This involved the use of two sentiment 
surveys: The University of Michigan's Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS) and the 
Index of Housing Sentiment (IHS). The results showed that inclusion of the surveys 
reduced the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) of the statistical forecasts by 
approximately 34% - the forecasts being produced using an Error Correction Model 
(ECM) and a Box-Jenkins Auto-regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) 
model.  The consumer sentiment measures were both based on five questions, 
eliciting the respondents’ view of current business conditions as well as their 
perceptions of future economic prospects.  In addition, the IHS survey tracked 
consumer views on whether the current period was a good or bad time to buy a house.  
While the IHS forecasts were slightly more accurate, the near identical specification 
and high statistical correlation between the IHS and ICS forecasts suggested that both 
indices reflect similar information and neither is superior to the other in forecasting 
housing starts, a somewhat surprising finding, given the more narrowly defined Index 
of Housing Sentiment. 
 
Forecasting is an essential aspect of all business planning, the above research has 
shown that qualitative and quantitative methods can be used to make predictions 
about the future levels of housing activity. It is also possible that different forecasting 
methods will be more accurate at different times, or under different economic 
circumstances.  However, this is seldom done in practice, and hence the motivation in 
this paper to determine the level of accuracy of forecasts produced by these 
organisations.  This research considers the accuracy of housing commencement 
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forecasts of three Australian organisations – the Housing Industry Association (HIA), 
the Indicative Planning Council for the Housing Industry (IPC) and BIS-Shrapnel – 
and is examined through the empirical analysis of their published forecast data.  This 
is supplemented by qualitative data in the form of opinions elicited from several 
industry ‘experts’ employed in these organisations. 
 
METHOD 
 
Forecasting performance was determined by comparing the forecast with the actual 
number of housing commencements for the period as collected several months later 
by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. The forecasts produced by three organisations 
were collected to analyse the performance of Australian housing industry forecasting. 
These organisations comprised: 
 
1. The Housing Industry Association (HIA)-A private-sector industry association 
comprising mainly house construction contractors. Forecasts produced by the HIA 
were produced by an economic forecaster who is employed to produce predictions 
as an information service to members, 
 
2. The Indicative Planning Council for the Housing Industry (IPC) – Government 
sponsored agency directed by an industry advisory board, which provides housing 
forecasts for use by industry and the general public. 
 
3. BIS-Shrapnel-A private sector consultancy firm, which produces economic and 
housing forecasts as part of a subscription service to clients. 
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Data from each of the above organisations was collected and examined for suitability 
in determining the level of accuracy and bias of their forecasts.  The information 
related to the forecast of the number of housing commencements in each time per 
period (quarterly, six-monthly, or yearly).  These forecasts were then compared with 
the actual number of commencements for the period on an ex-post basis.   
 
In addition, each of the above organisations was contacted and invited to comment on 
their methods.  The interviewees comprised representatives from: the Canberra and 
Melbourne offices of the Housing Industry Association; a Senior Economist, Master 
Builders Association of Western Australia; and the Deputy Executive Director, 
Master Builders Association, Canberra.  During interviews the aims of the forecasting 
were articulated, together with the costs associated with producing them, and any 
other additional information that affected their forecasting. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
This research was limited to publicly available published information on housing 
forecasts, of which little actually exists.  The results of the analysis, and discussion, of 
the three organisations’ forecasts follow. 
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The Housing Industry Association 
 
The Housing Industry Association (HIA) uses a combination of time-series and 
judgemental methods.  Quarterly forecasts from 1983 to 1996 were published by the 
Victorian office, and have been analysed below.  
 
Fig 1. Australian Housing Starts 
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Let at be the actual value for housing starts at time t, as shown in Fig 1.  Let fj,t be the j 
quarter-ahead forecast of at.  The series of one-quarter-ahead forecasts, f1,t, is plotted 
with at in Fig 2.  The one-quarter-ahead forecast errors are defined as ej,t = at – fj,t. The 
one-quarter-ahead forecast errors e1,t are plotted in Fig 3a. 
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Figure 2. One-quarter-ahead forecasts 
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Figure 3a. One-quarter-ahead forecast errors 
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Table 1. Evaluation of the HIA forecasts 
Quarters 
ahead 
RMSE1 MAPE2 U3 Correct 
direction 
(%) 
Bias 
1 628.12 6.11 1.02 71 −40.31 
2 790.22 7.87 1.30 59 −219.48 
3 911.15 9.38 1.02 71 −204.22 
4 1071.21 11.40 0.95 65 −371.92 
5 1274.27 14.55 0.93 64 −666.86 
6 1496.06 17.16 0.97 70 −903.92* 
7 1644.44 18.87 0.96 71 −1051.19* 
1- Root Mean Squared Error, 2-Mean Absolute Percentage Error, 3-Theil’s U 
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The absolute values of the RMSE statistics are not easily interpretable.  However, the 
relative values show that the forecasts become less accurate as the forecast horizon 
increases. This is to be expected, as it is more difficult to forecast further into the 
future.  The same conclusion follows from the MAPE statistics – the average 
percentage error is 6.11% when forecasting one quarter ahead and 18.87% when 
forecasting seven quarters ahead.  
 
The U statistic for one and two-quarter ahead are much greater than one  This is not a 
good result because it shows that using the naive forecast would have been more 
accurate.  Naive forecasts are very simple and cheap to calculate and perform about as 
well or better than the HIA forecasts for two-quarter horizons.  The three-quarter-
ahead forecasts have U almost equal to one, and the longer horizon forecasts have U 
values slightly less than one, which indicates slightly better forecasting. 
 
The Correct Direction statistics are all greater than 50%, and the bias statistics are all 
negative.  Since the forecast errors are calculated as ej,t = at – fj,t, this means that the 
HIA forecasts have a tendency to be too large.  However, this tendency is statistically 
significant for the six and seven-quarters-ahead forecasts only. 
 
The results for forecasting efficiency are summarised in the following estimated 
regressions. 
 
( )
( ) ( )
4, 4, 42.60
5, 5, 5 5, 62.08 1.76
ˆ 336.1 0.34 ,
ˆ 645.5 0.45 0.37 .
t t
t t t
e e
e e e
−
− −−
= − +
= − + −  
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These equations are simple autoregressions with the order selected using Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC).  The figures in brackets are t statistics, which if greater 
than two indicate that the corresponding coefficient is significantly different from 
zero.  A significant coefficient on a lagged forecast error indicates forecast error 
autocorrelation.  
 
The first equation, for the four-quarter-ahead prediction errors, shows significant 
autocorrelation because of the significant first lags.  Therefore, the four-quarter-ahead 
forecasts are inefficient.  The other equation shows significant inefficiency exists for 
forecasts five-quarters ahead.  Equations for the one, two, three, six and seven-
quarters-ahead forecasts are not presented because no significant autocorrelation was 
found. 
 
For further visual inspection, graphs of the forecasts and forecast errors are given for 
the two up to seven-quarters-ahead forecasts.  In each graph, the errors are scaled on 
the left axis and the forecasts and actual values on the right axis. 
 
Fig 1b. Two-quarters-ahead forecasts 
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Fig 2c. Three-quarters-ahead forecasts 
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Fig 3d. Four-quarters-ahead forecasts 
-3000
-2000
-1000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96
Error Forecast Actual
 
 
Fig 3e. Five-quarters-ahead forecasts 
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Fig 3f. Six-quarters-ahead forecasts 
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Fig 3g. Seven-quarters-ahead forecasts 
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The Indicative Planning Council for The Housing Industry (IPC) 
 
The IPC was a government-sponsored organisation that produced half-yearly 
forecasts, for each Australian State and nationally. Forecasts were collected for the 
period 1985 to 1998. The IPC used a combination of sophisticated econometric 
models with an adjustment based on subjective inputs.  
 
National forecasts 
The summary statistics for the IPC national forecasts are given in Table 2. 
Table 2. Evaluation of the IPC Australian forecasts 
Quarters 
ahead 
RMSE1 MAPE2 U3 Correct 
direction 
(%) 
Bias 
1 1131 2.6 0.49 85 318 
2 1868 4.4 0.46 77 676 
3 2678 5.8 0.46 77 1227 
4 4652 10.2 0.64 62 2364* 
5 4969 9.6 0.59 67 1714 
6 5225 10.8 0.56 83 1213 
7 4912 11.3 0.50 92 618 
8 5874 14.9 0.59 92 -48 
1- Root Mean Squared Error, 2-Mean Absolute Percentage Error, 3-Theil’s U 
 
 
As is expected, the RMSE and MAPE statistics increase with the forecast horizon.  As 
mentioned earlier, not too much should be made of comparisons across forecast 
horizons.  For example, because all forecasts are made in June each year, the one-
quarter-ahead forecasts are always forecasting the September quarter while the two-
quarters- head forecasts are forecasting the December quarter.  While the data are 
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seasonally adjusted, it is still possible that the September quarter is inherently easier 
to forecast than the December quarter, or vice versa. 
 
The U statistics are good, showing that the forecasts are approximately twice as 
accurate as the naive forecasts in RMSE terms.  Therefore, the IPC forecasts do have 
some benefit over the naive forecasts.  In addition, the forecasts quite often predict the 
change to be in the correct direction, as much as 92% of the time. 
 
The bias statistics are mostly positive, which means that there is a slight tendency to 
under-forecast.  This is particularly the case for the four-quarters-ahead forecasts 
where the bias is statistically significant.  This is likely to be due to a one-off large 
error for the June quarter of 1994 of 11088, or 23%, compared with the average 
percentage error of 10.2%. 
 
No statistically significant evidence of inefficiency was found in these forecasts so no 
autocorrelation equations are reported. 
 
State forecasts 
 
The summary forecast statistics for the IPC forecasts for New South Wales, Victoria, 
Queensland and Western Australia are given in Tables 3 to 6. 
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Table 3.  Evaluation of the IPC New South Wales forecasts 
Quarters 
ahead 
RMSE1 MAPE2 U3 Correct 
direction 
(%) 
Bias 
1 1614 5.1 0.72 73 901* 
2 2830 11.5 0.77 82 1022 
3 3275 9.7 0.71 91 1378 
4 3480 12.7 0.71 82 1400 
1- Root Mean Squared Error, 2-Mean Absolute Percentage Error, 3-Theil’s U 
 
Table 4. Evaluation of the IPC Victoria forecasts 
Quarters 
ahead 
RMSE1 MAPE2 U3 Correct 
direction 
(%) 
Bias 
1 1447 7.2 0.89 73 -836* 
2 2083 11.6 0.76 82 -396 
3 2807 16.8 0.81 64 -1246 
4 3713 21.4 0.99 73 -1074 
1- Root Mean Squared Error, 2-Mean Absolute Percentage Error, 3-Theil’s U 
 
Table 5. Evaluation of the IPC Queensland forecasts 
Quarters 
ahead 
RMSE1 MAPE2 U3 Correct 
direction 
(%) 
Bias 
1 1395 4.9 0.50 82 582 
2 3164 11.8 0.65 82 1533 
3 6065 20.5 0.97 73 2364 
4 3983 16.1 0.56 91 1465 
1- Root Mean Squared Error, 2-Mean Absolute Percentage Error, 3-Theil’s U 
 
 
Table 6. Evaluation of the IPC Western Australia forecasts 
Quarters 
ahead 
RMSE1 MAPE2 U3 Correct 
direction 
(%) 
Bias 
1 950 7.8 0.61 73 261 
2 2090 12.7 0.80 73 1030 
3 2217 14.8 0.66 82 668 
4 2343 17.4 0.61 91 784 
1- Root Mean Squared Error, 2-Mean Absolute Percentage Error, 3-Theil’s U 
 
The IPC state forecasts generally share the same properties as the Australian 
forecasts.  That is, they are mostly a considerable improvement on naive forecasts, 
predict in the correct direction and have mainly insignificant biases.  No evidence of 
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forecast inefficiency was found.  One interesting point was that the IPC generally 
under-predicted for all states except Victoria, where they generally over-predicted. 
 
The HIA and IPC forecasts are for different time series over different but overlapping 
time periods.  Therefore, only general qualitative comparisons can be made between 
the accuracy of the two sets of forecasts.  It is clear, however, that the IPC forecasts 
have superior summary statistics to the HIA forecasts.  It is not possible though to say 
by how much they are superior. 
 
BIS-Shrapnel 
 
The models were estimated on quarterly data from December 1959 to September 1980 
using multiple-regression.  Two approaches were used to test the forecasting ability of 
the models.  Firstly, the models' short term forecasts were prepared with forecasts 
based on an analysis of the market information and short-term indicators of 
movements in building activity eg. real estate prices and vacancy rates.   
 
Where necessary, trend forecasts of the model were then adjusted by a constant 
amount upward or downward to provide a link with the short-term deviation from the 
trend.  Secondly, the model outputs were reconciled with the results of a demographic 
based approach.  If the two approaches yielded significantly different results, a 
detailed examination of both the econometric and demographic approaches would be 
undertaken. 
 
    
17
Table 7. BIS-Shrapnel forecasts (Indicators of performance only) 
Quarters 
ahead* 
RMSE1 MAPE2 U3 Bias 
1 11,823 6.82 0.83 6,151 
 
1- Root Mean Squared Error, 2-Mean Absolute Percentage Error, 3-Theil’s U 
* Forecast of annual housing commencements, Australia one year ahead.  
 
The results of their forecasts show that BIS-Shrapnel performed quite well compared 
to the naive approach.  Forecasts covered the period from 1979 to 1998.  However, 
the results above can only be considered as an indication of forecasting performance.  
This is because a complete set of their forecasts could not be obtained. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The research concentrated on documenting the relative performance of forecasting 
housing commencement forecasts. So it makes sense to attempt to summarise the 
forecasting accuracy of the various organisations. However, it is important to note that 
each forecasting attempt was produced to meet a range of needs. All the IPC forecasts 
are comparable because they were all published at the same time. However, the other 
forecasts were produced at different economic times, therefore are strictly 
comparable. Nevertheless, the Table below (Table 8) outlines the Mean Absolute 
Percentage Errors of one-year housing commencement forecasts. 
 
The results show that forecasting by the IPC had different levels of accuracy for 
forecasts at a national level compared to state based forecasts. The results seem to 
indicate that it is easier (lower forecasting error MAPE) to produce national forecasts 
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than forecasts for individual states. All the state-based forecasts produced by the IPC 
have MAPE within the range of 11.5% to 12 %. This is significantly different to the 
national forecast MAPE for the same period of 4.4%.  
 
This conclusion seems to be validated by the results of the HIA forecasts. Table 8 
shows that although the HIA forecasts cover a different time period to that of the IPC, 
the level of accuracy is similar. (i.e. 11.6% for HIA compared to 11.4 % IPC, Vic) 
Consequently, it is likely that housing commencements are more difficult to predict at 
a state level than they are at a national level. 
 
 
    
19
Table 8. Comparative Performance of One-Year Residential Forecasts 
Organisation 
& Location 
Economic Period 
(3) 
Forecast Variable Error 
(MAPE) 
Chase, USA 1976-1983 Investment in residential studies  
(Real), USA (1) 
13.5%  
DRI, USA 1976-1983 Investment in residential studies  
(Real), USA (1) 
10.9%  
WEFA, USA 1976-1983 Investment in residential studies  
(Real), USA (1) 
 
10.5%  
IPC, Aust 1985-1998 No. of  Dwelling Commencements 
Aust (2)  
4.4%  
BIS-Shrapnel, 
Aust 
 
1978-1998 No. of  Dwelling Commencements 
Aust (2) 
6.8% 
IPC, NSW 1985-1998 No. of  Dwelling Commencements 
NSW (2) 
11.5%  
IPC, Qld 1985-1998 No. of  Dwelling Commencements 
QLD (2) 
11.8%  
IPC, WA 1985-1998 No. of  Dwelling Commencements 
WA (2) 
12.7%  
IPC, VIC 1985-1998 No. of  Dwelling Commencements 
VIC (2) 
11.6%  
HIA, Vic 1983-1996 No. of  Dwelling Commencements 
VIC (2) 
11.4%  
(1) Adams, F. G. (1986) "The business forecasting revolution: Nation-Industry-Firm, Oxford 
University Press, New York p 143 
(2) Indicative Planning Council and ABS Cat 8750/8752 
(3) Forecast covers different time periods and so are not directly comparable 
 
Representatives of the organisations interviewed suggested that if more current 
demographic and financial data were available it would increase the accuracy of the 
assumptions used in their models.  In particular, it was suggested that if the 
forecasting variables were available at a regional level it would substantially improve 
their ability to estimate demand outside major state capital cities. 
 
In addition, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) series related to housing finance 
also includes a variety of other loans that may not relate to the construction of new 
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homes, further adding to the difficulties associated with determining the link between 
Finance, Approvals and Commencements.  According to one HIA interviewee, "The 
problem with housing finance is that the series is too volatile and therefore 
statistically unreliable when used for forecasting purposes”. Nevertheless, the housing 
finance series remains an important data source which is relied upon by forecasting 
organisations. 
 
Building Approvals produced by the ABS is another series that was considered a 
problem by the forecasters interviewed.  Again, the interviewees suggested that it was 
becoming statistically unreliable for forecasting purposes.  According to the 
respondents the difficulty was that the ABS makes many revisions to the data and that 
this makes it more difficult to use for forecasting purposes.  The ABS current 
procedure is only to produce estimated data, so monthly statistics can fluctuate quite 
significantly.  To quote one interviewee, "Sometimes you have to go to the data on 
quarterly basis in order to get the information that is needed.  In other words, 
approvals and finance are less useful than they once were, and are becoming less 
reliable for forecasting purposes.  This is making housing forecasting an even more 
difficult task”. 
 
In addition, the MBA interviewee suggested that business sentiment surveys are an 
important indicator of future prospects for housing.  He suggested that if more 
extensive surveys of business attitude and consumer confidence were available it 
would very be beneficial to forecasters, especially for short to medium-term forecasts.  
This seems to support the research done by Weber (1996) where sentiment indicators 
significantly improved the accuracy of housing forecasts in the USA. 
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Past research has showed that different forecasting methods had different levels of 
performance (Adams 1986).  According to the MBA interviewee, the problem with 
econometric forecasting methods is that there is no guarantee that the exogenous 
variable assumptions that underlie the forecast are correct.  This issue was commented 
on extensively by all the forecasters interviewed.  The HIA senior economist 
suggested that many of his forecasts have been "correct for the wrong reasons, and at 
other times incorrect but for the right reasons".   
 
Many experts interviewed suggested that users of their forecasts had different needs 
anyway.  The benefit to users is that it produces a picture of the future direction of the 
industry from which business planning becomes clearer.  If this is so, accuracy is 
important, but so is a well-argued justification of the forecast and its underlying 
assumptions.  This seems to support extensive research undertaken in the US by 
Adams (1986) where it is demonstrated that many organisations use extensive 
econometric models because of their ability to explain an entire system.  This allows a 
structured model to be created, representing a certain paradigm of economic thinking.  
Once the paradigm is built it remains the task of individual firms to interpret their 
own reaction to it in the form of a business plan. 
 
Furthermore, the survey undertaken by the American Statistical Society of major 
economic variables uses an average of a range of individual forecasters and thereby, 
according to Adams (1986), producing successful forecasts.  However, the issue of 
averaging forecasts has the capacity to polarise opinions.   
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There has been considerable debate by Adams (1986) and Winkler and Makridakis 
(1993) about the merits or otherwise of simply averaging or combining point 
forecasts.  The supporters of the concept suggest that it brings to bear different 
perspectives that are not explained in an individual model.  In addition, research 
undertaken by Mills (1997) showed that time-series forecasts averaged with opinion-
based forecasts out-performed the individual forecasts of building price movements.  
 
Another perspective was also given by a MBA interviewee, who suggested that one of 
the advantages of averaging was that it allowed a group of forecasters to know what 
others have been thinking.  In that way, it may lead them to modify their forecasts in 
the light of other alternative views.  The other MBA interviewee, however, believed 
that a broad based consensus of different forecasts could discount the quality of the 
best forecast in the group, and therefore will not improve the understanding of the 
variable under consideration.   
 
Consequently, it may be reasonable to suggest that predicting the future level of any 
economic variable is likely to remain "art form".  Nevertheless, as McNees (1981) has 
pointed out, "To adopt perfection as the appropriate standard for forecast evaluation 
would not only be naive, but counterproductive.  Naive because we know that the 
future cannot be predicted perfectly, and counterproductive because experience has 
shown that less than perfect forecasts provide valuable information about the future".  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
This research has been limited to publicly available published information on housing 
forecasts, of which little actually exists.  Consequently, it has been difficult to gather 
sufficient data to fully explore the range of statistical measures necessary to 
conclusively identify either very good or very poor forecasting. 
 
The U-statistics results indicate that the IPC method is an improvement over simply 
using a naive approach.  In other words, the forecasting did add value by improving 
the accuracy of forecasts compared to what could have been achieved by simpler and 
less costly approaches.  In addition, the forecasts did not display any significant 
inaccuracy.  The IPC forecast for Australia predicted the correct direction of the time-
series between 62% and 92% of the time, a result that seems appropriate under the 
circumstances, and better than chance alone.   
 
The IPC's own review of its forecasting (IPC 1996) suggested that determining the 
direction of the time-series may be more important than the accuracy of the single 
point estimates.  This introduces the notion that forecasting bias can be an important 
indicator of quality.  The results of the IPC forecasts do not display any consistent 
bias overall but by their own analysis of the events (IPC 1996), there were 
circumstances when their forecasting underestimated the length of downturns and 
predicted recoveries in advance of their actual occurrence.  In other words, the IPC 
admitted that a degree of optimism had crept into their forecasts at certain periods.   
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It was not surprising that both the HIA and MBA interviewees suggested that their 
members would prefer to see housing activity rise than fall.  There was some evidence 
of forecasting inefficiency for forecasts four-to five quarters-ahead, but the effects are 
small and should not be significant to individual HIA members using the information 
for business planning purposes. 
 
As has been already reported, many of the industry experts interviewed believed that 
improving the accuracy of housing forecasting would be a desirable goal.  However, it 
should be said that they were less clear about how that goal should be achieved.  This 
research did not attempt to quantify the economic value of improved forecasting, nor 
was any attempt made to determine the cost of producing the forecasts.  
Consequently, it was not possible to determine if the benefits of improved forecasting 
outweigh the cost of producing the forecast.  It is also worth noting that the HIA or 
the IPC did not recover the full cost of producing housing forecasts.  Instead, these 
organisations produce forecasts as part of a marketing and information service.   
 
The long term planning of the community’s need for housing must be high in the 
minds of both government policy makers and private sector firms.  It may be 
reasonable to suggest that Governments have an interest in understanding the ongoing 
development of housing and for self-interest alone may derive benefit in encouraging 
better forecasting from the industry.   
 
In conclusion, it may be useful for organisations with an interest in housing forecasts 
to keep a record of accomplishment of their own forecasting, or alternatively support 
a register which monitors the track record of forecasting performance.  This could be 
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similar to the work undertaken by Stephan McNees at the Federal Reserve Bank in 
Boston, USA. 
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